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STATEMENT OF FACTS
(All italics, unless otherwise noted, are plaintiffs')

On May 20, 1931, applicant Clarence Petersen was
injured in the course of employment at the Utah-Apex
Mining Company at Bingham Canyon, Utah, and sustained, ·among other injuries, a fractured left knee. The
Mining Company at the time of accident carried workSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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men's compensation insurance with the United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Company, and reported the accident to the Industrial Commission of Utah on May 29,
1931. On December 8, 1933, Clarence Peters-en appeared
before a Medical Advisory Committee at the Industrial
Commission offices at the State Capitol, Salt Lake City,
Utah (R.4). The testimony at that time indicated
permanent partial disability of fifty per cent as the
result of injuries sustained in the accident.
Thereafter, on December 19, 1933, a settlement
agreement was executed between Petersen and the Mining and Insurance co~panies in full compromise of nll
payments due and to become due for said injuries (R.
51, plaintiffs' exhibit 1). Petersen received from the
insurance com;pany on or before December 19, 1933, a
total of $5,197.36, which sum included compensation payments of $3,076.48 and medical, hospital, nursing, and
transportation payments of $2,120.88 (R. 13).
On July 17, 1948, more than 14 years after the date
of the settlement -agreement and completion of payments thereunder and more than 16 years after the accident, Petersen for the first time filed an application
for compensa~tion resulting from the injury of May 20,
1931. The insurance company declined liability (R. 19),
and on August 25, 1948, a hearing on this application
was conducted by the Industrial Commission. Thereafter, on November 8, 1948, the Commission filed its
decision in the case, the findings and order ( R. 28)
reading as follows:
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FINDINGS
'' ..._-\..fter hearing the testimony in the case and reviewing the same as set forth in the transcript and other
documentary evidence receiYed and made a part of the
record, the Commission finds that the applicant became
temporarily disabled on December 6, 1947, because of
a moderate osteomyelitis at the old point of fusion of the
knee joint; that this disability was a result of the injury
to the applicant's left knee on May 20, 1931; that the
applicant is therefore entitled to the benefits under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, i.e. payment for temporary total compensation from December ·6, 1947 to
June 13, 1948; that his permanent partial ·disability following his release from the hospital and treatment by
the doctor was 50% loss of bodily function which was
not in excess of the disability rated following the Injury on May 20, 1931.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants pay for all hospital and medical expense incurred
in the recent recurrence of the effects of the old injury
of May 20, 1931, ·and compensation as follows:
27 weeks at $13.41 -

12-6-47 to 6-13-48- $362.07''

Mr. Earl J. Groth appeared for the defendants at
the hearing on August 25, 1948, and at the outset of the
proceedings and prior to the introduction of evidence,
objected to the hearing on the ground that the Commission was without jurisdiction because· of the statute of
limitations, and further because the settlement agreeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ment precluded further claim. The details of the objections are set forth at pages 32 to 34 of the record.
Apparently Petersen re'turned to work for the Mining Company after the settlement in 1933, and continued to work for that company until April of 1938, although whether this employment ceased because of discharge or the closing of the Utah-Apex Mining Company
opera,tions is not clear from the record (R. 40) ; neither
is it clear as to just what he did during the years from
1938 to 1945, although he apparently left Bingham (R.
45). In 1945, he did some leasing work (R. 37), and
between that year and December, 1947, he operated a
card room at Eureka (R. 40). On December 6, 1947,
Petersen entered a hospital at Bingham, Utah, for further tre~atment to the · left knee and leg, and was discharged on June 13, 1948 (R. 47).
The injuries sustained in the accident of May 20,
1931, were of a serious nature and resulted in a permanent partial disability of fifty per cent. During all
of the years from 1933 to 1947, when he reentered the
hospital, he had had constant trouble with his knee
which bothered him all the time (R. 35), and had been
operated on in a General Hospital two different times
(R. 40) for this knee injury.
Dr. Paul ·S. Richards of Bingham, Utah, was the
attending physician at the time of the original injury,
and during the period between the time Petersen returned to work after the accident and the year 1938,
treated Petersen's knee every month (R. 44). Dr.
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Richards did not again see applicant until September,
1947, when the leg was infected under the area of the
old operations ·at time of injury, which latter infection
the Doctor attributed to the old injury (R. 43). The
Doctor also testified that upon discharge from the hospital on June 27, 1948, Petersen's condition was about
the same as that of the time of discharge immediately
after the accident, with the same amount of disability
(R. 46).
In confirmation of the file of the Industrial Commission, Petersen testified that the application of July
17, 1948, was the only application he had ever made
with the Industrial Commission for compensation (R.
40).
STATEMENT OF ERRORS
Plaintiffs rely up-on the following errors :
Error No.1
That the Industrial Commission of Utah erred in
awarding compensation and hospital and medical expense, since claim was not made by ·defendant within
three years from date of accident or date of last payment of compensation, and the claim therefore was
barred by the statute of limitations.
Error No.2
That the Industrial Commission of Utah erred in
awarding compensation for 27 weeks at $13.41 per week
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from December 6, 1947, to June 13, 1948, since all temporary total disability must arise within six years of
the date of injury and this award was therefore barred
by statute of limitations.
ARGUMENT
Error No.1
For the convenience of the court, section 42-1-92,
Utah Code Annotated 1943, which is believed to be one
of the applicable statutes of limitations of Title 42,
is set forth :
''When an employee claiming to have suffered
an injury in the service of his employer fails to
give notice to his employer of the time and place
where the accident and injury occured, and of the
nature of the same, within forty-eight hours, when
possible, or fails to report for medical treatment
within said time, the compensation provided for
herein shall be reduced fifteen per cent; provided,
that knowledge of such injury obtained from any
source on the part of such employer, his managing
agent, superintendent, foreman or other person in
authority, or knowledge of any assertion by the
injured sufficient to afford an opportunity to the
employer to make an investigation into the facts
and to provide medical treatment shall be equivalent to such notice; and no defect or inaccuracy
therein shall subject the claimant to such reduction, if there was no intention to mislead or prejudice the employer in making his defense, and
the employer was not, in fact, so misled or prejudiced thereby. If no notice of the accident and
injury is given to the employer within one year
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from the date of the nrrident, the right to compensation shall be "'"holly barred. If no claim for
compensn tion is filed "\Yi th the Industrial Commission "\Yithin three years from the da'te of the accident or the date of the last payment of compensation, the right to compensation shall he wholly
barred''.
The facts of the instant case are free from conflict.
Clarence Petersen sustained an injury in the course of
employment on May 20, 1931, and pursuant to settlement agreement the last compensation was paid on December 19, 1933. Presumably the matter was closed,
until July 17, 1948, at which time and for the first time,
an application for compensation was filed by Petersen,
after a lapse of more than fourteen years.
It will be noted that the statute above quoted provides that a claim for compensation must be filed within
three years from the date of the accident or the date .of
the last payment of compensation. The statute seems
clear and unambiguous, and the right to compensation
under the facts of the case had long since expired, by
July 17, 1948.
A point of inquiry arises relative to the time at
which Petersen became aware of a disability as a result
of the accident. The evidence clearly establishes that
he was not only aware of it from the time .of the injury
in 1931, but continued to be fully cognizant of his difficulties at all times until he entered the hospital in December of 1947. It will be noted that the settlement
agreement itself recognized a dis a hili ty ·of fifty percent
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in 1933. Between that time and the year 1938, Petersen
consulted Dr. Paul Richards monthly for the same injury -and complications for which compensation is now
asked. After the year 1938, he testified that he was
hospitalized at least once in addition to the initial hospitalization. In addition to the~e undis1puted facts,
Petersen also stated that during all of the period of
time between 1933 ·and entering the hospital in December of 1947, his knee was constantly bothering him and
in a condition which interfered with his employment.
This case is clearly one where the employee at all times
knew that he had an injury and appreciated the effect
of that injury on his employment. It is not a case where
the injured employee suddenly discovers that an injury
has resulted from an accident, some years after the date
of the accident.
The case of Hallstrom v. Industrial Commission of
Utah, 96 Utah 85, 83 P. 2d 730 (1938) is very similar
factually. In that case, Plaintiff Hallstrom was employed as a deputy warden by the State Fish and Game
Department, and injured his .ankle on April 20, 1931,
while cleaning some ponds. He consulted Dr. T. A.
Dannenburg ·and received treatment, although nothing
was said of any pain or injury to the left hip. Hallstrom continued his work, and was paid a regular salary,
with the result that the compensation awarded was
turned over to the Fish & Game Department, and the
Doctor bill paid by the State Insur-ance Fund.
Hallstrom, however, noticed some pain in his left
hip a month or so after the accident, which continued
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thereafter and also the leg seemed to get shorter. A
year later, he obtained a special shoe for the left foot
because of this shortening. Nothing 'vas done ·about the
continued hip pains until X rays "\Yere taken in Febru-

ary, 1938, which showed a degeneration in the left hip.
Compensation was denied, and the court stated at page
730:
''The first question to be determined is
whether plaintiff's application for compensation
"~as filed within the statutory iJleriod. · Plaintiff
asserts that the statute did not commence to run
until he discovered that he might be entitled to
compensation for the injury to his hip. This discovery was made shortly before the X-ray pictures
were taken. Plaintiff claims that as long as he was
unaware that he might he entitled to compensation the statute did not run. He relies on the re·cent decision of this court in Salt Lake City v.
Industrial Commission, 93 Utah 510, 74 P. 2d 657
to support his argument. The decision in that
case held that the statute did not begin to run
until there was a disability. The disability or
compensable injury as it is sometimes called,
gives rise to a duty to pay compensation if the
disabled person is entitled to comp·ensation at
all. It is not necessary in this case to determine
at what stage of the disability the statute would
commence inasmuch as the evidence is conclusive
that the disability complained of was apparent
more than three years before application for compensation was made. According to plaintiff's own
testimony be became aware of pain in his left hip
soon after the accident. He testified that this
pain continued and his left leg commenced to get
shorter until it became necessary to have a special
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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shoe made for his left foot. This occurred back
in 1932, the application was not made for comrpensa·tion until March, 1938. The mere fact that
an applicant does not deduce from an ·apparent
physical infirmity the conclusion that it came
from a former accident occurring in industry
does not prevent the statute from running."
The case in effect held that the statute begins to
run from the date the dis·ability is known to the employee~ While this decision was in 1938, and the statute
quoted above was amended in 1939 by the addition of
the last sentence thereof, the same reasoning as to the
commencement of the right to claim compensation has
been followed in subsequent cases. See Salt Lake City
v. Industrial 1Commission, 104 Utah 436, 140 P. 2d 644
(1943), although the facts are distinctly different from
those of the instant case.
See also Edwards v. Industrial Commission, 189 P.
2d 124 (Utah, 1948).
Error No.2
There is another as pect of the time limitation which
deserves consideration. Section 42-1-61 Revised S-tatutes of Utah, 1933 (which so far as we are here concerned is unchanged to the present time, although
amendments have been m·ade in some details) reads as
follows:
1

"In case of temporary disability, the employee shall receive 60 per cent of his average
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weekly wages so long as such disabili·ty is total;
not to exceed a maximum of $16 per week, and
not less than a minimtun of $7 per week; provided, that "\Yhere the vvage earned at the time
of injury is less than $7 per week, the amount of
wages earned shall be the amount of compensation to be paid. In no case sha.ll su.ch compensation co1l.t-inue for rnore than six years from the
date of the infury or exceed $5,000."
The Hallstrom case, supra, clearly indicates that
the right to compensation commences at the time the
effect of the accident is so apparent as to indicate an
injury which is compensable. As has been previously
pointed out in detail, Clarence Petersen clearly possessed such knowledge during the early part .of the
1930's, and the injury within the meaning of the Compensation Act occurred at that time. The decision of
the Industrial Commission rendered N O"£:ember 8, 1948,
seems clearly to attempt to provide for compensation
for temporary disability more than six years from the
date of the injury.
It will be noted that this statute above is a limitation as to the extent, both as to time and amount, on
compensation payment. It limits compensation to a six
year period following the injury, .or to the sum of $5,000
in the event payments during the six years happened
to make an award in excess of that sum. It does not,
however, permit payments for temporary disability at
a time some fourteen years after the injury as the Commission has attempted to do in the instant case.
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We are unable to find a Utah case interpreting this
statute from the standpoint ·of the problem here involved, and have likewise been unable to locate a case
from another jurisdiction interpreting a similar statute.
For this reason, we are unable to refer the court to
previous authority. The statute, however, seems so
clear that citation of authority is, in any event, unnecessary.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the award of
the Industrial Commission cannot be -sustained, and that
the same should be annulled and set aside.
Respectfully submitted,
Earl Groth and Robert Spooner
Skeen, Thurman and Worsley

Attorneys for PZaintiffs.
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